Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Advese Selection Insurance Economy

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Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Advese Selection Insurance Economy

Author Info

Kahn, C.M.
Mookherjee, D.

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Abstract

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Paper provided by Chicago - Economics Research Center in its series University of Chicago - Economics Research Center with number 91-5.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:chicer:91-5

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Other versions of this item:

Article
- Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95. [Downloadable!]
Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dan Anderberg, 1999. "Adverse selection, competition, and linear self-insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 3-15, Spring. [Downloadable!]
Lazarova, Emiliya & Borm, Peter & Velzen, Bas van, 2005. "Contracts and insurance group formation by myopic players," Discussion Paper 89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]

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