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Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Advese Selection Insurance Economy

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Author Info

  • Kahn, C.M.
  • Mookherjee, D.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Chicago - Economics Research Center in its series University of Chicago - Economics Research Center with number 91-5.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:chicer:91-5

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, ECONOMICS RESEARCH CENTER, NORC, CHICAGO ILLINOIS 60637 U.S.A.
Phone: (773)834-0761
Web page: http://economics.uchicago.edu/research.shtml
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Keywords: economic equilibrium ; information ; game theory;

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Cited by:
  1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, 04.
  2. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. Lazarova, E.A. & Borm, P.E.M. & Velzen, S. van, 2005. "Contracts and Insurance Group Formation by Myopic Players," Discussion Paper 2005-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Asheim, Geir B. & Nilssen, Tore, 1996. "Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1717-1736, December.
  5. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95.
  6. Daripa, Arup, 2008. "Optimal collective contract without peer information or peer monitoring," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 147-163, April.
  7. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Dan Anderberg, 1999. "Adverse selection, competition, and linear self-insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 3-15, Spring.
  9. Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.

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