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Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system

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Author Info
Greenberg, Joseph
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYG981-5X/2/05c0c53af68fd18d60fc5462cfbb9aff
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 49 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 195-202
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:49:y:1989:i:1:p:195-202

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95. [Downloadable!]
  2. Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers _001, University of Chicago, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1990. "A "coalition proof" equilibrium for a private information credit economy," Working Paper 90-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Alberto Alesina & Howard Rosenthal, 1989. "Moderating Elections," NBER Working Papers 3072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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