Michael Suk-Young Chwe (University of Chicago, Department of Economic)
Abstract
I define the largest consistent set, a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts, act publicly, and are fully ``farsighted'' in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. I establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting. I argue that it improves on the von Neumann- Morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Chicago, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
_001.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: