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Farsighted Coalitional Stability

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  • Michael Suk-Young Chwe

    (University of Chicago, Department of Economic)

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    Abstract

    I define the largest consistent set, a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts, act publicly, and are fully ``farsighted'' in that a coalition considers the possibility that once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. I establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting. I argue that it improves on the von Neumann- Morgenstern stable set as it is usually defined but is consistent with a generalization of the stable set as in the theory of social situations.

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    File URL: ftp://ftp.repec.org/RePEc/wop/chicec/chicec_001.ps
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Chicago, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number _001.

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    Date of creation: May 1993
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    Handle: RePEc:wop:chicec:_001

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    Keywords: farsighted; coalition;

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    1. Le Breton, M & Salles, M, 1990. "The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 111-27.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj & Sengupta, Kunal & Vohra, Rajiv, 1989. "A consistent bargaining set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 93-112, October.
    3. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1992. "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 101-121, January.
    4. Moulin, H. & Peleg, B., 1982. "Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 115-145, June.
    5. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
    6. Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1993. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Papers, Boston University - Department of Economics 21, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    7. Kalai, Ehud & Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1976. "Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 44(2), pages 233-40, March.
    8. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
    9. Thomson, A., 1989. "The Consistency Principle," RCER Working Papers 192, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    10. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1980. "Stability of decision systems under majority rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 150-159, October.
    11. Wilson, Robert, 1971. "Stable coalition proposals in majority-rule voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 254-271, September.
    12. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
    13. E. Kalai & D. Schmeidler, 1975. "An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    14. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
    15. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
    16. John C. Harsanyi, 1974. "An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 20(11), pages 1472-1495, July.
    17. Sen, Amartya K, 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(1), pages 53-89, January.
    18. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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