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Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm

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Author Info
Ichiishi, T.
Sertel, M.R.

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Abstract

The present paper proposes new concepts and a new scenario with which to analyze cooperative interim contracting and re-contracting in an organization.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) in its series ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica with number 161.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:inecpu:161

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Postal: ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica Facultad de Ciencias Economicas Y Empresariales . Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre, 83. 48015 Bilbao. Spain
Phone: + 33 - 4 91 14 07 70
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Web page: http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/ASSET/
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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; GAME THEORY;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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