On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories

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On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories

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Sprumont, Yves

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 93 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 205-232
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:93:y:2000:i:2:p:205-232

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Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2006. "Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets," Working Papers ubs0609, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2006. "Afriat’s Theorem for General Budget Sets," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2009. "Afriat's theorem for general budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 135-145, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jose Penalva & Michael Ryall, 2008. "Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1362-1362. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2005. "Learning From a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," THEMA Working Papers 2006-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: the Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," Cahiers de recherche 0619, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
Andrés Carvajal, 2003. "Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 003555, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Andrés Carvajal, 2004. "Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/26, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
- Andrés Carvajal, . "Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains," Borradores de Economia 229, Banco de la Republica de Colombia. [Downloadable!]
Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "Core Rationalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Working Papers 2000-07, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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- BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000. "Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Cahiers de recherche 2000-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
- Bossert, W. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Cahiers de recherche 2000-09, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
Robert R. Routledge, 2009. "Testable implications of the Bertrand model," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0918, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
Susan Snyder & Indrajit Ray, 2004. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 407, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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- Indra Ray & Susan Snyder, 2003. "Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games," Working Papers 2003-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity," Cahiers de recherche 2006-13, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
Arianna Degan & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Do Voters Vote Ideologically?, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]

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