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Choix de consommation des ménages en présence de plusieurs décideurs

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  • Dauphin, Anyck

    (Centre de recherches pour le développement international (CRDI))

  • El Lahga, Abdel-Rahmen

    (Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis)

  • Fortin, Bernard

    (Département d’économique)

  • Lacroix, Guy

    (Département d’économique)

Abstract

Recently, a new theoretical framework has been proposed to analyze the behavior of households composed of two adults. This approach, usually referred to has the “collective model”, assumes that spouses have distinct preferences and that household decisions are Pareto efficient. So far, most empirical studies based on the collective approach have focused on households made up of two decision makers thus ignoring households in which there may be more (e.g., couples with adult children or parents in developed countries, extended families in developing countries). The purpose of this paper is twofold: first we summarize the main tests that have been proposed to empirically verify the constraints that derive from the collective setting. We also present a new test that is equivalent to an existing test but that is easier to implement in certain circumstances. Second, we test the multiple-person collective model using British survey data. The sample comprises couples with a single child aged 16 or older. Our results reject the collective model with one or two decision-makers, but do not reject it when three decisions-makers are assumed. Récemment, un nouveau cadre théorique d’analyse s’est développé dans le but d’analyser les comportements des ménages avec deux conjoints. Cette approche, qualifiée de modèle collectif, suppose que chaque conjoint a des préférences individuelles et que les choix du ménage sont Pareto-optimaux. Toutefois, les études empiriques réalisées jusqu’à maintenant sur les modèles collectifs ont porté essentiellement sur des ménages à deux décideurs et ignorent le comportement des ménages qui en comptent potentiellement un plus grand nombre (p. ex., couples vivant avec des enfants adultes ou avec des personnes âgées dans les pays développés, familles élargies dans les pays en développement). Le but de cet article est double : dans un premier temps, nous présentons de façon synthétique les principaux tests qui ont été proposés pour vérifier empiriquement les contraintes du modèle collectif dans un tel contexte. Nous proposons également un test qui s’avère être équivalent à un autre test présenté dans la littérature mais qui dans certains cas s’avère plus facile à mettre en oeuvre. Dans un deuxième temps, nous testons le modèle collectif à plusieurs décideurs à l’aide d’une enquête sur des microdonnées britanniques. L’échantillon retenu comprend des couples avec un enfant de 16 ans et plus. Les résultats rejettent le modèle collectif avec un ou deux décideurs mais ne le rejettent pas dans le cas de trois décideurs.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 82 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (mars-juin)
Pages: 87-118

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Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:82:y:2006:i:1:p:87-118

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Cited by:
  1. Frederic Vermeulen & Olivier Bargain & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Richard Blundell & Raquel Carrasco & Maria-Concetta Chiuri & François Laisney & Valérie Lechene & Nicolas Moreau & Michal Myck , 2006. "Collective Models of Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 113-127, 06.
  2. Djebbari, Habiba, 2005. "The Impact on Nutrition of the Intrahousehold Distribution of Power," IZA Discussion Papers 1701, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Robert V. Breunig & Rebecca J. McKibbin, 2012. "Income Pooling between Australian Young Adults and Their Parents," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 26(2), pages 235-265, 06.

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