Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies
AbstractWe study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population, and we extend the analysis of Maniquet and Sprumont (2004) to the case when contributions cannot be negative, i.e. agents cannot receive subsidies from others.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2006-11.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
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social ordering; blic good; maximin;
Other versions of this item:
- Marc Fleurbaey & Yves Sprumont, 2009. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 1-8, 02.
- FLEURBAEY, Marc & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Cahiers de recherche 08-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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- repec:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/23404 is not listed on IDEAS
- Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July.
- MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2002.
"Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good,"
Cahiers de recherche
2002-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2004. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 627-640, 03.
- Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Economics Working Papers 0014, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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