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Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

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Author Info
MANIQUET, François
SPRUMONT, Yves

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Abstract

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2002-04.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2002-04

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Related research
Keywords: fairness; excludable nonrival good; social orderings;

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  1. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Working Papers 0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
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  2. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Yves Sprumont, 1998. "Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 543-558. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  7. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marc Fleurbaey & Koichi Tadenuma, 2009. "Universal Social Orderings," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-024, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2008. "Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 415-429, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. FLEURBAEY, Marc & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Cahiers de recherche 2006-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being," IDEP Working Papers 0312, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France. [Downloadable!]
  5. Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Fair Income Tax," Economics Working Papers 0021, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. SPRUMONT, Yves & MANIQUET, François, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach," Cahiers de recherche 2006-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marc Fleurbaey, 2004. "Two Criteria for Social Decisions," Economics Papers 2004-W27, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  8. Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, . "Money metric utilitarianism," Working Papers 1295, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  9. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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