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Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good

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Moulin, Herve

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Abstract

In an economy with one public and one private good, egalitarian-equivalent cost sharing consists of finding the highest public good level, x*, such that consuming x* for free yields a feasible utility distribution. The corresponding feasible allocation (typically unique), called egalitarian-equivalent, is in the core of the economy. Conversely, any cost sharing method satisfying Pareto optimality, cost monotonicity (nobody suffers a utility loss if the production technology improves upon, ceteris paribus), and individual rationality (no single-agent coalition objects) or no private transfers (no agent receives a positive amount of private good), must select an egalitarian-equivalent allocation in every economy. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 55 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 963-76
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:4:p:963-76

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  1. Borm, P.E.M. & Ju, Y. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "Compensating losses and sharing surpluses in project-allocation situations," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Louis Kaplow, 2003. "Public Goods and the Distribution of Income," NBER Working Papers 9842, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Jose Aizpurua & Antonio Manresa, 1994. "A decentralized and informationally efficient mechanism realizing fair outcomes in economies with public goods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 141-158, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2007. "Equal Sacrifice and Fair Burden Sharing in a Public Goods Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Parkash Chander, 2004. "The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 108, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Economics Working Papers 0014, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2007. "The Edgeworth Conjecture in a Public Goods Economy: An Elementary Example," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(6), pages 1-4. [Downloadable!]
  8. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "Justifying the Lindahl Solution as an Outcome of Fair Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  9. Miguel Gines & Francisco Marhuenda, 1996. "Cost monotonic mechanisms," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 89-103, January. [Downloadable!]
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  10. FLEURBAEY, Marc & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Cahiers de recherche 2006-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  11. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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