A fair solution to the compensation problem
AbstractWe study equity in economies where agents are endowed with different, non transferable, personal talents. To compensate them for such differences a given amount of money needs to be shared among them. We axiomatize a family of social orderings over allocations based on efficiency, fairness and robustness properties. Taking into account incentive constraints we derive the optimal policy: individuals with the same talent need to be equally compensated and only people whose level of talent is below a certain threshold should receive a positive compensation.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2007077.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
compensation; talents; fairness; axioms; social orderings; incentive- compatibility;
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, .
"Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1805, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 93-127, 09.
- Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002.
"Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments,"
Economics Working Papers
0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2006.
"Compensation and responsibility,"
- Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet, 2002.
"Fair Income Tax,"
Economics Working Papers
0021, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Roland Iwan Luttens & Erwon Ooghe, 2004.
"Is it fair to "make work pay"??,"
Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers
ces0410, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
- R. I. Luttens & E. Ooghe, 2005. "Is it fair to “make work pay”?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/283, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008.
"Fair social orderings,"
Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Valletta Giacomo, 2012. "Health, Fairness and Taxation," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- CALO-BLANCO, Aitor, 2012. "The compensation problem with fresh starts," CORE Discussion Papers 2012036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CALO-BLANCO, Aitor, 2012. "Responsibility, freedom, and forgiveness in health care," CORE Discussion Papers 2012004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.