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A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem

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  • Dur, Umut

Abstract

Abstract This paper characterizes the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem. Schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. For each school a strict priority ordering of students is determined by the school district. Each student has strict preference over the schools. We first define weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the unique Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies the weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. To our knowledge this is the first axiomatic approach to the top trading cycles mechanism in the school choice problem where schools have a capacity greater than one.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 41366.

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Date of creation: 15 Sep 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:41366

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Keywords: Top Trading Cycles Mechanism; School Choice Problem;

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  1. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  2. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  3. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1988. "Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 11-27, February.
  4. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
  5. Alcalde, Jose & Barbera, Salvador, 1994. "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 417-35, May.
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  7. Kesten, Onur, 2006. "On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 155-171, March.
  8. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 12-2003, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
  10. Parag A. Pathak, 2011. "The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 513-536, 09.
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