Allocation of objects with conditional property rights
AbstractThis paper considers the allocation of indivisible goods among members of a collective assuming that individuals are given the right to retain certain goods when some individuals alter the allocation problem. The assignment of rights is exhaustive in that, for every good x, either individual i can exercise a right over x against j or j against i. It is shown that the only Pareto efficient allocation rules satisfying these requirements are those having a hierarchy of diarchies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 19469.
Date of creation: 20 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Allocation rule; hierarchy of diarchies; indivisible good; property right.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-16 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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