The problem of allocating a single indivisible unit to one of several selfish agents is considered, where monetary transfers are not allowed, and the unit is not necessarily desirable to each agent. In addition to strategyproffness, three important properties are considered: Pareto-optimality, nondictatorship, and nonbossiness. It is shown that these four criteria cannot be satisfied by any social choice function, that is, a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result is established for nonbossy mechanisms.
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Paper provided by Koc University in its series Papers with number
1998/02.