Core convergence with asymmetric information

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Core convergence with asymmetric information

Author Info

McLean, Richard
Postlewaite, Andrew

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Andrew Postlewaite

Abstract

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 50 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 58-78
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:50:y:2005:i:1:p:58-78

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Paper
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Penn CARESS Working Papers 7f6ff09d59945e06909ce4fa4, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," CARESS Working Papres 99-14, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2421-2453, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 527-535, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
McLean, Richard P. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2003. "Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 222-241, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Richard P. McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers b52ac626d6631b39913783700, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies," Papers 34-99, Tel Aviv.
Other versions:
- F. Forges & A. Heifetz & E. Minelli, 1999. "Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies," THEMA Working Papers 99-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 011, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 99-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2000. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0141, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Sun, Yeneng & Zhang , Yongchao, 2008. "Individual Risk and Lebesgue Extension without Aggregate Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 7448, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Sun, Yeneng & Zhang, Yongchao, 2009. "Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 432-443, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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