From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik
AbstractWe derive the existence of a Walras equilibrium directly from Nash's theorem on noncooperative games. No price player is involved, nor are generalized games. Instead we use a variant of the Shapley-Shubik trading-post game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1360.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2003), 39: 391-400
Note: CFP 1065.
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
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- Hens, Thorsten & Reimann, Stefan & Vogt, Bodo, 2004. "Nash competitive equilibria and two-period fund separation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 321-346, June.
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