Nash Implementation in Production Economies

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Nash Implementation in Production Economies

Author Info

Hong, Lu

Abstract

This paper provides a general way to incorporate private ownership production economies into the implementation of the Walrasian correspondence. We present two mechanisms, both of which permit agents to behave strategically with respect to their initial endowments, preferences, and production possibility sets. The first mechanism deals with the case of endowment destruction, the second deals with the case of endowment withholding. We show that each mechanism Nash implements the Walrasian correspondence. In addition, both mechanisms are individually feasible, balanced, continuous and only require the transmission of prices and quantities of goods as messages.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 5 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 401-17
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:5:y:1995:i:3:p:401-17

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2006. "Triple Implementation by Sharing Mechanisms in Production Economies with Unequal Labor Skill," Discussion Paper Series a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings, for example of authors and institutions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.