This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Akira Yamada ()
Naoki Yoshihara ()
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
No abstract is available for
this item.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory .
Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 85-106
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:85-106Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm
Order Information: Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).
Keywords: Labor sovereignty ; Triple implementation ; Different labor skills ; C72 ; D51 ; D78 ; D82 ; Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Naoki Yoshihara, 2000.
"Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions in Production Economies with Unequal Skills ,"
Discussion Paper Series
a396, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
Other versions: Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, Francois, 1996.
"Fair allocation with unequal production skills: The No Envy approach to compensation ,"
Mathematical Social Sciences ,
Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 71-93, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tian, Guoqiang, 2000.
"Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 294-320, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roemer, J.E., 1988.
"On Public Ownership ,"
Papers
317, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
Hong, Lu, 1995.
"Nash Implementation in Production Economies ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 401-17, May.
Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994.
"Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments ,"
Review of Economic Design ,
Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kranich, Laurence, 1994.
"Equal Division, Efficiency, and the Sovereign Supply of Labor ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 178-89, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1999.
"Characterizing Natural Implementability: The Fair and Walrasian Correspondences ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 271-293, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Maskin, Eric, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hal R. Varian, 1994.
"A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed} ,"
Microeconomics
9401003, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Varian, H,R., 1991.
"A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed ,"
Papers
10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
Varian, Hal R, 1994.
"A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-93, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994.
"Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990.
"Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism ,"
Working Papers
754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!] Matthew O. Jackson, 1990.
"Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms ,"
Discussion Papers
966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!] Roemer John E. & Silvestre Joaquim, 1993.
"The Proportional Solution for Economies with Both Private and Public Ownership ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 426-444, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Yoshihara, Naoki, 1998.
"Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions ,"
Mathematical Social Sciences ,
Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 165-184, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Naoki Yoshihara, 1999.
"Natural and double implementation of public ownership solutions in differentiable production economies ,"
Review of Economic Design ,
Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 127-151.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 1997.
"Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 205-213, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1991.
"A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 106-123, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Guoqiang Tian, 1999.
"Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 689-707.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Naoki Yoshihara, 2000.
"On Effcient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games ,"
Discussion Paper Series
a397, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996.
"Toward Natural Implementation ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
Other versions: Naoki Yoshihara, 2000.
"A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 571-599.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2002.
"A Mechanism Design for a Solution to the Tragedy of Commons ,"
Discussion Paper Series
a424, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
Other versions:
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-14.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .