Surplus Sharing with a Two-State Mechanism
AbstractIn this article we consider environments where agents jointly produce a private output good by contributing privately owned resources. An efficient Outcome may not be realized due to strategic behavior and conflicting interests of the agents. We construct a two-stage mechanism, building on a Varian mechanism. The modified mechanism ensures an equilibrium for a large class of preferences and guarantees the feasibility of outcomes. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 41 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Yamada, Akira & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2006.
"Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economics with unequal labor skill,"
Discussion Paper Series
a475, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September.
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