Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economics with unequal labor skill
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- Akira Yamada & Naoki Yoshihara, 2007. "Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 85-106, September.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
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More about this item
Keywordslabor sovereignty; triple implementation; different labor skills;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-26 (All new papers)
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