Cost Sharing : Efficiency and Implementation
AbstractWe study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The social decision involves the determination of input contribution and output distribution. We define a competitive solution when there is decreasing returns-to-scale and show that it leads to a Pareto optimal outcome.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 44-96.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
More information through EDIRC
ECONOMIC MODELS ; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ; PRODUCTION ; DECISION MAKING;
Other versions of this item:
- C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
- D58 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
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- BONNISSEAU, Jean-Marc & CORNET, Bernard, .
"Existence of marginal cost pricing equilibria in economies with several nonconvex firms,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-941, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Cornet, Bernard, 1990. "Existence of Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria in Economies with Several Nonconvex Firms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 661-82, May.
- Hurwicz, L, 1979. "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 217-25, April.
- Ding Lu, 2001. "Shared network investment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(3), pages 299-312, October.
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