Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium
AbstractThis paper defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium'', a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without binding agreement, to coordinate their choice of strategies and make joint objections; moreover, it takes the perfect foresight of rational players fully into account. The merit of the notion of negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium is twofold: (1) It offers a way to rectify the nestedness assumption and myopia embedded in the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (2) The negotiation process is formalized by a "graph", which serves as a natural extension to the approach that models preplay communication by an extensive game.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: October 1998/Final version: May 2000
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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