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Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

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Author Info
Pranab K. Bardhan (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley)
Nirvikar Singh (Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz)

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Abstract

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/dev/papers/0407/0407003.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Development and Comp Systems with number 0407003.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 02 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0407003

Note: 33 pages, Acrobat .pdf
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
P0 - Economic Systems - - General

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  1. Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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