Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action
AbstractIn a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt1mg8p7tc.
Date of creation: 01 May 2004
Date of revision:
inequality; self-enforcing; collective action; infrastructure;
Other versions of this item:
- Bardhan, Pranab & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5qp5h30x, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Pranab K. Bardhan & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action," Development and Comp Systems 0407003, EconWPA.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P0 - Economic Systems - - General
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- Licun Xue, 2000. "Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 339-357.
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