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Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
  2. Forgo, Ferenc & Fulop, Janos & Prill, Maria, 2005. "Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 160(1), pages 252-267, January.
  3. Wolinsky, Asher, 2002. "Eliciting information from multiple experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 141-160, October.
  4. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Extended Conversations in Sender-Receiver Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 126, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  5. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  6. Francisco Silva, 2016. "Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit?," Documentos de Trabajo 477, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  7. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
  8. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  9. repec:dau:papers:123456789/171 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2005. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," UC3M Working papers. Economics we057238, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  11. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  12. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
  13. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  15. Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011. "Perfect implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
  16. Joseph Abadi & Markus Brunnermeier, 2018. "Blockchain Economics," NBER Working Papers 25407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
  18. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
  19. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  20. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
  21. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomics 0504024, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  22. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  23. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
  24. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
  25. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2015. "Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
  27. Arifovic, Jasmina & Boitnott, Joshua F. & Duffy, John, 2019. "Learning correlated equilibria: An evolutionary approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 171-190.
  28. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2004. "Fiscal- Monetary Policy and Debt Management: a Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Working Papers in Public Economics 74, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
  29. Kar, Anirban & Ray, Indrajit & Serrano, Roberto, 2010. "A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 189-193, May.
  30. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8159 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
  32. Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, New Economic School (NES).
  33. Vijay Krishna, R., 2007. "Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 584-592, January.
  34. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.
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