This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Extended Conversations in Sender-Receiver Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
R. Vijay Krishna ()
Abstract

Aumann and Hart (Econometrica, Nov. 2003) have shown that in games of one-sided incomplete information, the set of equilibrium outcomes achievable can be expanded considerably if the players are allowed to communicate without exogenous time limits and completely characterise the equilibria from such communication. Their research provokes (at least) four questions. (i) Is it true that the set of equilibriumpayoffs stabilises (i.e. remains unchanged) if there are sufficiently many rounds of communication? (ii) Is the set of equilibria from communication which is unbounded but finite with probability one is the same as equilibria from communication which is just unbounded? (iii) Are any of these sets of equilibria “simple” and if so, is there an algorithm to compute them? (iv) Does unbounded communication (of order type w) exhaust all possibilities so that further communication is irrelevant? We show that in the context of finite Sender-Receiver games, the answer to all four is yes if the game satisfies a certain geometric condition. We then relate this condition to some geometric facts about the notion of bi-convexity and argue that if any of the questions has a negative answer then all three of the questions are likely to have a negative answer.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/lct1.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 126.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 39
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:126

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 50 George Square, EH8 9JY, Edinburgh
Phone: +44(0)1316508361
Fax: +44(0)1316504514
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Santiago Sanchez-Pages).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Simon, Robert Samuel, 2002. "Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 79-102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.