Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Yannick Viossat

    () (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS : UMR7534 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX)

Abstract

We investigate whether having a unique equilibrium (or a given number of equilibria) is robust to perturbation of the payoffs, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. We show that the set of n-player finite games with a unique correlated equilibrium is open, while this is not true of Nash equilibrium for n>2. The crucial lemma is that a unique correlated equilibrium is a quasi-strict Nash equilibrium. Related results are studied. For instance, we show that generic two-person zero-sum games have a unique correlated equilibrium and that, while the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is not open, the set of symmetric bimatrix games with a unique and quasi-strict symmetric Nash equilibrium is.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/36/18/91/PDF/Is_Having_A_Unique_Eq_Robust_JME-resubmitted-June2007.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00361891.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008, 44, 11, 1152-1160
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00361891

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00361891/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Linear duality; Unique equilibrium; Quasi-strict equilibrium;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Myerson, Roger B., 1997. "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 183-202, October.
  2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  3. Ritzberger, Klaus, 1994. "The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 207-36.
  4. Nau, Robert F. & McCardle, Kevin F., 1990. "Coherent behavior in noncooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 424-444, April.
  5. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 515, March.
  6. Noa Nitzan, 2005. "Tight Correlated Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp394, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00360756, HAL.
  2. Lehrer, Ehud & Solan, Eilon & Viossat, Yannick, 2011. "Equilibrium payoffs of finite games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 48-53, January.
  3. Forges, Françoise, 2012. "Correlated equilibria and communication in games," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/171, Université Paris-Dauphine.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00361891

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.