Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria
AbstractWe show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 907.
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision: Apr 2006
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Correlated equilibrium; finite games;
Other versions of this item:
- Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2007. "Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 575-578, September.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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