Dual Reduction and Elementary Games
AbstractConsider the linear incentive constraints that define the correlated equilibria of a game. The duals of these constraints generate Markov chains on the players' strategy sets. The stationary distributions for these Markov chains can be interpreted as the strategies in a reduced game, which is called a dual reduction. Any equilibrium of a dual reduction is an equilibrium of the original game. We say that a game is elementary if all incentive constraints can be satisfied as strict inequalities in a correlated equilibrium. Any game can be reduced to an elementary game by iterative dual reduction.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1133.
Date of creation: Jun 1995
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nau, Robert F. & McCardle, Kevin F., 1990. "Coherent behavior in noncooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 424-444, April.
- DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1992.
"Perfect correlated equilibria,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1992039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Roger B. Myerson, 1984.
"Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria,"
591, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1974.
"Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
- R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
- AUMANN, Robert J., . "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP -167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:fth:louvco:9239 is not listed on IDEAS
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fran Walker).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.