Tight Correlated Equilibrium
AbstractA correlated equilibrium of a strategic form n-person game is called tight if all the incentive constraints are satisfied as equalities. The game is called tight if all of its correlated equilibria are tight. This work shows that the set of tight games has positive measure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp394.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-04 (All new papers)
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