Stochastic evolution with slow learning
AbstractThis paper studies the extent to which diffusion approximations provide a reliable guide to equilibrium selection results in finite games. It is shown that they do for a class of finite games with weak learning provided that limits are taken in a certain order. The paper also shows that making mutation rates small does not in general select a unique equilibrium but making selection strong does.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Note: Received: January 19, 2000; revised version: September 25, 2000
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Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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