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On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism

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Author Info
Aviad Heifetz (Tel Aviv University)
Yossef Spiegel (Tel Aviv University)
Abstract

Successful individuals were frequently found to be overly optimistic. This is puzzling because it might be thought that optimistic individuals who consistently overestimate their eventual payoffs will not do as well as realists who see the situation as it truly is and hence will not survive evolutionary pressures. We show that contrary to this intuition, there is a large class of either competitive or cooperative strategic interactions between randomly matched pairs of individuals in the population, in which "cautiously" optimistic individuals not only survive but also prosper and take over the entire population. The reason for this result is that optimistic individuals who overestimate the impact of their actions on their payoffs, behave more aggressively than realists and pessimists. When the interactions between individuals involve negative externalities (the payoff of one player decreases with the actions taken by another player) and the actions are strategic substitutes, being aggressive induces the opponent to be softer, so optimists gain a strategic advantage that, for moderate levels of optimism, outweighs the loss from having the wrong perception of the environment. Likewise, when the interactions between individuals involve positive externalities and the actions are strategic complements, being aggressive triggers a favorable aggressive behavior from the opponent. Hence, in both cases, cautiously optimistic types fare better on average than other types of individuals. We show that if the initial distribution of types is sufficiently wide, then over time it will converge in distribution to a mass point on some level of cautious optimism.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 1649.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1649

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ok, E.A. & Vega-Redondo, F., 1999. "On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: Complete Versus Incomplete Information Scenarios," Working Papers 99-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Oechssler, Joerg, and Frank Riedel, . "Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces," Discussion Paper Serie A 606, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Robson, Arthur J., 1996. "A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-expected Utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 397-424, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kai A. Konrad & Amedeo Spadaro, 2003. "Selection Filters, Redistributive Taxation and Overconfidence," DELTA Working Papers 2003-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  2. Konrad, Kai A. & Spadaro, Amedeo, 2005. "Education, Redistributive Taxation and Confidence," IZA Discussion Papers 1478, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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