On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: Complete Versus Incomplete Information Scenarios

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On the Evolution of Individualistic Preferences: Complete Versus Incomplete Information Scenarios

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Ok, E.A.
Vega-Redondo, F.

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Abstract

We study the evolution of preferences via payoff monotonic dynamics in strategic environments with and without complete information. It is shown that, with complete information and subgroup matching, empirically plausible interdependent preference relations may entail the local instability of individualistic preferences (which target directly the maximization of material payoffs/fitness). The said instability may even be global if the subgroup size is large enough. In contrast, under incomplete information (unobservability of preference types), we show that independent preferences are globally stable in a large set of environments, and locally stable in essentially any standard environment, provided that the number of subgroups that form in thesociety is large. Since these results are obtained within the context of a very general model, they may be thought of as providing an evolutionary rationale for the prevalence of individualistic preferences.

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Paper provided by C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University in its series Working Papers with number 99-07.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:99-07

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

Cited by:
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Aviad Heifetz & Yossef Spiegel, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1649, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Heifetz, Aviad & Spiegel, Yossi, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergency of Optimism," Working Papers 1104, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

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