Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Education, Redistributive Taxation and Confidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Konrad, Kai A.

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance)

  • Spadaro, Amedeo

    ()
    (Paris School of Economics)

Abstract

We consider redistributional taxation between people with and without human capital if education is endogenous and if individuals differ in their perceptions about own ability. Those who see their ability as low like redistributive taxation because of the transfers it generates. Those who see their ability as high may also like redistributive taxation because it stops other people receiving education and increases the quasi rents on their own human capital. It is surprising that this rather indirect effect can overcompensate them for the income loss from taxation and make the overconfident want higher taxes than the less confident do. The results, however, turn out to be in line with empirical evidence on the desired amount of redistribution among young individuals.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp1478.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1478.

as in new window
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Public Economics, 2006, 90(1-2), 171-188
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1478

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: confidence; redistribution; education;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Roland Benabou & Efe A. Ok, 1998. "Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis," NBER Working Papers 6795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Agell, J. & Lommerud, K.E., 1990. "Union Egalitarianism As Income Insurance," Papers, Uppsala - Working Paper Series 1990a, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  3. Sjur Didrik Flåm & Alf Erling Risa, 2003. "Ability, Self-Confidence, and Search," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(3), pages 439-, September.
  4. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "Attitudes toward income inequality in France: Do people really disagree?," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9918, CEPREMAP.
  5. Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1984. "Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 8424, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  6. Glazer Amihai & Konrad Kai A., 1994. "Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 278-291, November.
  7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  8. Francesco Squintani, 1999. "On-the-Job Signaling and Self-Confidence," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1274, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Hans-Werner Sinn, 1995. "Social Insurance, Incentives, and Risk Taking," NBER Working Papers 5335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2001. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 500-528, June.
  11. Ravallion, Martin & Lokshin, Michael, 2000. "Who wants to redistribute?: The tunnel effect in 1990s Russia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 87-104, April.
  12. Heifetz, A. & Spiegel, Y., 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism," Papers, Tel Aviv 2000-24, Tel Aviv.
  13. Pauly, Mark V., 1973. "Income redistribution as a local public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 35-58, February.
  14. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1974. "Redistribution and the Pareto Criterion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(4), pages 752-57, September.
  15. Aviad Heifetz & Yossi Spiegel, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1304, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
  17. Aviad Heifetz & Yossef Spiegel, 2000. "On the Evolutionary Emergence of Optimism," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1649, Econometric Society.
  18. Piketty, Thomas, 1995. "Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 551-84, August.
  19. Fong, Christina, 2001. "Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 225-246, November.
  20. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1995. " A Theory of the Welfare State," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 495-526, December.
  21. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 9.
  22. Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Salvador Balle & Amedeo Spadaro, 2006. "Optimal Nonlinear Labor Income Taxation in Dynamic Economies," Working Papers 19, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
  2. Falch, Torberg & Fischer, Justina AV, 2011. "Welfare state generosity and student performance: Evidence from international student tests," MPRA Paper 35269, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Bernasconi, Michele & Profeta, Paola, 2012. "Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96.
  4. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00590555 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Schneider, Andrea, 2010. "Redistributive taxation vs. education subsidies: Fostering equality and social mobility in an intergenerational model," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 597-605, August.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1478. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.