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Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms

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  • Luciano Andreozzi

Abstract

Hayek's approach to cultural and institutional evolution has been frequently criticized because it is explicitly based on the controversial notion of (cultural) group selection. In this paper this criticism is rejected on the basis of recent works on biological and cultural evolution. The paper's main contention is that Hayek employed group selection as a tool for the explanation of selection among several equilibria, and not as a vehicle for the emergence of out of equilibrium behavior (i.e. altruism). The paper shows that Hayek's ideas foreshadowed some of the most promising developments in the current literature on the emergence of norms.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2005-03.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2005-03

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References

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  1. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  2. Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "Decentralization and the Coordination Problem," Game Theory and Information 9403004, EconWPA.
  3. Daniel Friedman, 2010. "On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 53, David K. Levine.
  4. Hodgson, Geoffrey M., 1991. "Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution: An Evaluation in the Light of Vanberg's Critique," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(01), pages 67-82, April.
  5. De Vlieghere, Martin, 1994. "A Reappraisal of Friedrich A. Hayek's Cultural Evolutionism," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(02), pages 285-304, October.
  6. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  7. Bhaskar, V & Vega-Redondo, F, 1996. "Migration and the Evolution of Conventions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 354.96, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  8. Andy Denis, 2002. "Was Hayek a Panglossian Evolutionary Theorist? A Reply to Whitman," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 275-285, September.
  9. Vanberg, Viktor, 1986. "Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(01), pages 75-100, April.
  10. repec:att:wimass:9325 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
  12. repec:att:wimass:9323 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. José Canals & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1998. "Multi-level evolution in population games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 21-35.
  14. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
  15. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gedeon, Péter, 2007. "Piaci rend és társadalmi normák. Hayek elmélete a társadalmi evolúcióról
    [Market order and social norms. Hayeks theory of social evolution]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 1-28.
  2. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy," Post-Print halshs-00346389, HAL.
  3. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 259-279, September.
  4. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2007. "L'Analyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de l'Héritage Hayékien," ICER Working Papers 45-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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