Multi-level evolution in population games
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1993) where the population is partitioned into groups and evolution takes place "in parallel" at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-run equilibrium. This provides an explicitly dynamic basis for a conclusion reminiscent of those put forward in the biological literature by the so-called theories group selection. From a normative viewpoint, it suggests the potential importance of "decentralization", here understood as local and independent interaction.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.
Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Note: Received April 1995/Revised version October 1996
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