Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Giorgio Fagiolo
  • Luigi Marengo
  • Marco Valente

Abstract

Population learning in dynamic economies traditionally has been studied in contexts where payoff landscapes are smooth. Here, dynamic population games take place over “rugged” landscapes, where agents are uncertain about payoffs from bilateral interactions. Notably, individual payoffs from playing a binary action against everyone else are uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. This random population game leads the population to adapt over time, with agents updating both actions and partners. Agents evaluate payoffs associated to networks thanks to simple statistics of the distributions of payoffs associated to all combinations of actions performed by agents out of the interaction set. Simulations show that: (1) allowing for endogenous networks implies higher average payoff compared to static networks; (2) the statistics used to evaluate payoffs affect convergence to steady-state; and (3) for statistics MIN or MAX, the likelihood of efficient population learning strongly depends on whether agents are change-averse or not in discriminating between options delivering the same expected payoff.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08898480490480622
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Mathematical Population Studies.

Volume (Year): 11 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 121-147

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:taf:mpopst:v:11:y:2004:i:2:p:121-147

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GMPS20

Order Information:
Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GMPS20

Related research

Keywords: dynamic population games; bounded rationality; endogenous networks; fitness landscapes; evolutionary environments; adaptive expectations;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Fernando Vega Redondo & Ventakamaran Bhaskar, 1996. "Migration and the evolution of conventions," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1996-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Oechssler, Jorg, 1997. "Decentralization and the coordination problem," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-135, January.
  3. Edward Droste & Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson, 2000. "Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0594, Econometric Society.
  4. Alexander F. Tieman & Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan, 1998. "Cooperation in a Multi-Dimensional Local Interaction Model," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9803002, EconWPA.
  5. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9410003, EconWPA.
  6. Blume,L.E. & Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "The interactions-based approach to socioeconomic behavior," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 1, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2000. "Discrete choice with social interactions," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 7, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  9. L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
  10. Jackson, Matthew O., 1998. "The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1044, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  11. Page, Scott E, 1997. "On Incentives and Updating in Agent Based Models," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 10(1), pages 67-87, February.
  12. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 0113, Econometric Society.
  13. Ashlock, Daniel & Smucker, Mark D. & Stanley, E. Ann & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1996. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 1687, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  14. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
  15. Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
  16. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
  17. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2002. "Coordination, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics 98, Society for Computational Economics.
  18. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September.
  19. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
  20. Alan Kirman, 1997. "The economy as an evolving network," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 339-353.
  21. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Alexander Peterhansl, 2002. "Viability of Cooperation in Evolving Interaction Structures," Computing in Economics and Finance 2002, Society for Computational Economics 120, Society for Computational Economics.
  22. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  23. Goyal, Sanjeev & Janssen, Maarten C. W., 1997. "Non-Exclusive Conventions and Social Coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 34-57, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Giorgio Fagiolo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks," LEM Papers Series, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy 2004/17, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  2. Andreas Pyka & Giorgio Fagiolo, 2005. "Agent-Based Modelling: A Methodology for Neo-Schumpeterian Economics," Discussion Paper Series, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics 272, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  3. Giorgio Fagiolo & Alessio Moneta & Paul Windrum, 2007. "A Critical Guide to Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models in Economics: Methodologies, Procedures, and Open Problems," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 195-226, October.
  4. Paul Windrum & Giorgio Fagiolo & Alessio Moneta, 2007. "Empirical Validation of Agent-Based Models: Alternatives and Prospects," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 10(2), pages 8.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:mpopst:v:11:y:2004:i:2:p:121-147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.