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Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks

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  • Valente M.
  • Fagiolo G.

Abstract

In this paper we study a local version of the Minority Game where agents are placed on the nodes of a directed graph. Agents care about beingin the minority of the group of agents they are currently linked to and employ myopic best-reply rules to choose their next-period state. We show that, in this benchmark case, the smaller the size of local networks, the larger long-run population-average payoffs. We then explore the collective behavior of the system when agents can: (i) assign weights to each link they hold and modify them over time in response to payoff signals; (ii) delete badly-performing links (i.e. opponents) and replace them with randomly chosen ones. Simulations suggest that, when agents are allowed to weight links but cannot delete/replace them, the system self-organizes into networked clusters which attain very high payoff values. These clustered configurations are not stable and can be easily disrupted, generating huge subsequent payoff drops. If however agents can (and are sufficiently willing to) discard badly performing connections, the system quickly converges to stable states where all agents get the highest payoff, independently of the size of the networks initially in place

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 with number 110.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf4:110

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Keywords: Minority Games; Local Interactions; Non-Directed Graphs; Endogenous Networks; Adaptive Systems.;

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