In this paper we give a theoretical model of buyers' behaviour on a market for a perishable good where no prices are posted. We show that if buyers learn from their own previous experience there is a sharp division between those who learn to be loyal to certain sellers and those who continue to "shop around". This feature remains in more general models which are simulated and is consistent with empirical data from the Marseille fish market.
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Volume (Year): 110 (2000) Issue (Month): 463 (April) Pages: 411-36 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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