Social organization in the Minority Game model
AbstractWe study the role of imitation within the Minority Game model of market. The players can exchange information locally, which leads to formation of groups which act as if they were single players. Coherent spatial areas of rich and poor agents result. We found that the global effectivity is optimized at certain value of the imitation probability, which decreases with increasing memory length. The social tensions are suppressed for large imitation probability, but generally the requirements of high global effectivity and low social tensions are in conflict.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications.
Volume (Year): 286 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/physica-a-statistical-mechpplications/
Minority game; Self-organization; Economics;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Valente M. & Fagiolo G., 2004.
"Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2004
110, Society for Computational Economics.
- Giorgio Fagiolo & Marco Valente, 2005. "Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 25(1), pages 41-57, February.
- Giorgio Fagiolo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Minority Games, Local Interactions, and Endogenous Networks," LEM Papers Series 2004/17, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Shu-Heng Chen & Umberto Gostoli, 2011. "Agent-Based Modeling of the El Farol Bar Problem," ASSRU Discussion Papers 1120, ASSRU - Algorithmic Social Science Research Unit.
- Chen, Shu-Heng & Gostoli, Umberto, 2013. "Coordination in the El Farol Bar problem: The role of social preferences and social networks," Economics Discussion Papers 2013-20, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.