IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joevec/v23y2013i5p955-1000.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Feri
  • Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez

Abstract

This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that the long-run behavior of the system depends on a fine interplay of the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Feri & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, 2013. "Coordination in evolving networks with endogenous decay," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 955-1000, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:23:y:2013:i:5:p:955-1000
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00191-013-0313-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Equilibrium selection in stag hunt games," Other publications TiSEM bd92d0ae-790f-40ad-afea-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Bhaskar, V. & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2004. "Migration and the evolution of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 397-418, November.
    4. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2002. "On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 265-291, November.
    5. Dieckmann, Tone, 1999. "The evolution of conventions with mobile players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 93-111, January.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
    7. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    8. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2009. "Communication networks with endogenous link strength," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, May.
    9. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    10. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    11. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    12. Feri, Francesco, 2007. "Stochastic stability in networks with decay," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 442-457, July.
    13. Deroian, F., 2009. "Endogenous link strength in directed communication networks," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 110-116, January.
    14. Hojman, Daniel & Szeidl, Adam, 2006. "Core and Periphery in Endogenous Networks," Working Paper Series rwp06-022, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    15. Watts, Alison, 2001. "A Dynamic Model of Network Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 331-341, February.
    16. Ulrich Witt, 2008. "What is specific about evolutionary economics?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 547-575, October.
    17. Alan Kirman, 1997. "The economy as an evolving network," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 339-353.
    18. Carlsson, H. & Van Dame, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in Stag Hunt Games," Papers 9170, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    19. Ivar Kolstad, 2006. "What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 321-336, August.
    20. Dosi, Giovanni & Ermoliev, Yuri & Kaniovski, Yuri, 1994. "Generalized urn schemes and technological dynamics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-19, January.
    21. Ely Jeffrey C, 2002. "Local Conventions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, May.
    22. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    23. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2008. "Core and periphery in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 295-309, March.
    24. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Network Formation with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2005.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    25. G. Dosi & Y. Kaniovski, 2000. "On "Badly Behaved" Dynamics: Some Applications of Generalized urn Schemes to Technological and Economic Change," Chapters, in: Innovation, Organization and Economic Dynamics, chapter 13, pages 379-409, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    26. Dopfer,Kurt (ed.), 2005. "The Evolutionary Foundations of Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521621991.
    27. H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
    28. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1997. "Endogenous Interactions," CARESS Working Papres endo-one, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    29. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2006. "Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 112-130, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Harmsen - van Hout, Marjolein J.W. & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Dellaert, Benedict G.C., 2013. "Communication network formation with link specificity and value transferability," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 229(1), pages 199-211.
    2. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
    3. Antonio Parravano & Ascensión Andina-Díaz & Miguel A Meléndez-Jiménez, 2016. "Bounded Confidence under Preferential Flip: A Coupled Dynamics of Structural Balance and Opinions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(10), pages 1-23, October.
    4. Olaizola, Norma & Valenciano, Federico, 2020. "A connections model with decreasing returns link-formation technology," MPRA Paper 107585, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Charoensook, Banchongsan, 2012. "A noncooperative model of network formation with decreasing productivity," MPRA Paper 36570, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. De Jaegher, K. & Kamphorst, J.J.A., 2015. "Minimal two-way flow networks with small decay," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 217-239.
    7. Norma Olaizola & Federico Valenciano, 2023. "A connections model with decreasing returns link-formation technology," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 31-61, March.
    8. Norma Olaizola & Federico Valenciano, 2020. "Characterization of efficient networks in a generalized connections model with endogenous link strength," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 341-367, September.
    9. Chiu Ki So, 2016. "Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength and Decreasing Returns to Investment," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-9, December.
    10. Enrique Fatas & Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez & Antonio Morales & Hector Solaz, 2015. "Public goods and decay in networks," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 73-90, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Staudigl, Mathias & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2014. "Constrained interactions and social coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 41-63.
    2. Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
    3. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2018. "Social coordination with locally observable types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 975-1009, June.
    4. Cui, Zhiwei, 2023. "Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 410-430.
    5. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2015. "Social coordination with locally observable types," Department of Economics 0051, University of Modena and Reggio E., Faculty of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    6. Hellmann, Tim & Staudigl, Mathias, 2014. "Evolution of social networks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 583-596.
    7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    8. Péter Bayer & Ani Guerdjikova, 2020. "Optimism leads to optimality: Ambiguity in network formation," Working Papers hal-03005107, HAL.
    9. Feri, Francesco, 2007. "Stochastic stability in networks with decay," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 442-457, July.
    10. repec:esx:essedp:747 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Cui, Zhiwei & Shi, Fei, 2022. "Bandwagon effects and constrained network formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 37-51.
    12. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-093/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2005. "A Note on Equilibrium Selection in Polya-Urn Coordination Games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(45), pages 1-14.
    14. Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Network formation and social coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 178-207, February.
    15. Francesco Feri, 2005. "Network Formation with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2005.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Zhiwei Cui, 2019. "Matching, Imitation, and Coordination in Networks," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 47-67, March.
    17. Pin, Paolo & Weidenholzer, Elke & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2017. "Constrained mobility and the evolution of efficient outcomes," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 165-175.
    18. , D. & Tessone, Claudio J. & ,, 2014. "Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    19. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2022. "The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 50-57.
    20. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2004. "Endogenous Networks In Random Population Games," Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(2), pages 121-147.
    21. Matros, Alexander & Moser, Scott, 2015. "Coordination in a changing environment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 64-84.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coordination; Networks; Risk-dominance; Stochastic stability; C72; C73; D83; D85;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:23:y:2013:i:5:p:955-1000. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.