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Migration and the Evolution of Conventions

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Author Info
Bhaskar, V
Vega-Redondo, F

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Abstract

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy optimally to the new environment.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 354.96.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:354.96

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Related research
Keywords: ECONOMIC MODELS; GAMES;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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  1. S. Goyal & F. Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Learning, network formation and coordination," Econometric Institute Report 177, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Edward Droste & Robert P. Gilles & Cathleen Johnson, 2000. "Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0594, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kosfeld, M., 1999. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Research Memorandum 775, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sanjeev Goyal, 2003. "Learning in Networks: a survey," Economics Discussion Papers 563, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Francesco Feri & Miguel A.Meléndez-Jiménez, 2009. "Coordination in Evolving Networks with Endogenous Decay," Working Papers 2009-19, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
  6. Michael Kosfeld, 2004. "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 3(1), pages 19-41, March. [Downloadable!]
  7. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2005. "A Note on Equilibrium Selection in Polya-Urn Coordination Games," LEM Papers Series 2005/05, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Tone Dieckmann, 1997. "The Evolution of conventions with Mobile Players," Economics, Finance and Accounting Department Working Paper Series n720897, Department of Economics, Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth. [Downloadable!]
  9. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2003. "Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games," LEM Papers Series 2003/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Luciano Andreozzi, 2005. "Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 227-247, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. L. Andreozzi, 2005. "Hayek Reads the Literature on the Emergence of Norms," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
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