This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Dan Ashlock (Dept. of Mathematics, Iowa State Univ.)
Mark D. Smucker (Dept. of Computer Sciences, U of Wisc.-Madison)
E. Ann Stanley (Dept. of Math, Iowa State U)
Leigh Tesfatsion (Dept. of Econ and Dept. of Math, Iowa State U)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but defectors in smaller populations risk social isolation. We investigate these possibilities for an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which agents use expected payoffs to choose and refuse partners. In comparison to random or round-robin partner matching, we find that the average payoffs attained with preferential partner selection tend to be more narrowly confined to a few isolated payoff regions. Most ecologies evolve to essentially full cooperative behavior, but when agents are intolerant of defections, or when the costs of refusal and social isolation are small, we also see the emergence of wallflower ecologies in which all agents are socially isolated. In between these two extremes, we see the emergence of ecologies whose agents tend to engage in a small number of defections followed by cooperation thereafter. The latter ecologies exhibit a plethora of interesting social interaction patterns. Keywords: Evolutionary Game; Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Partner Choice and Refusal; Artificial Life; Genetic Algorithm; Finite Automata

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9501/9501002.ps.gz
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9501/9501002.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/9501/9501002.tex
File Format: application/x-tex
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9501002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 18 Jan 1995
Date of revision: 20 Jan 1995
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9501002

Note: Summary of paper in LaTeX, plus info how to obtain complete paper in hardcopy, in UUencoded gzipped Postscript (1.8Mb uncompressed) from a bulletin board, or via WWW
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tullock, Gordon, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 1073-81, Supp.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, D. & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2004. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," Game Theory and Information 9805004, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Esther Hauk, 1999. "Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with (out) an Outside Option: An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers 391, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2000. "Structure, Behavior, and Market Power in an Evolutionary Labor Market with Adaptive Search," Staff General Research Papers 1681, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Leigh TESFATSION, 1996. "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game With Preferential Partner Selection," Economic Report 38, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Esther Hauk, . "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Teaching Agent-Based Computational Economics to Graduate Students," Computational Economics 9809001, EconWPA, revised 16 Nov 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. M.G. Zimmermann, V. M. Eguiluz, 2001. "Evolution of Cooperative Networks and the Emergence of Leadership," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 171, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jack Robles, 2008. "Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 19-36, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2003. "Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games," LEM Papers Series 2003/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. David MCFADZEAN & Leigh TESFATSION, 1996. "A C++ Platform For The Evolution Of Trade Networks," Economic Report 39, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.