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Evolution and Endogenous Interactions

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Author Info
George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania)
Larry Samuelson (University of Wisconsin)
Avner Shaked (University of Bonn)

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Abstract

We examine an evolutionary model with "local interactions," so that some agents may be more likely to interact than others. We show that equilibrium strategy choices with given local interactions correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game, suggesting an new interpretation for correlated equilibrium. We then allow the pattern of interactions itself to be shaped by evolutionary pressures. If agents do not have the ability to avoid unwanted interactions, the heterogeneous outcomes can appear, including outcomes in which different groups play different Pareto ranked equilibria. If agents do have the ability to avoid undesired interaction, then we derive conditions under which outcomes must be not only homogeneous but efficient.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9410003.

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Date of creation: 26 Oct 1994
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9410003

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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  1. S. Goyal & F. Vega-Redondo, 1999. "Learning, network formation and coordination," Econometric Institute Report 177, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," Game Theory and Information 9805004, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1997. "- Unfolding Social Hierarchies In Large Population Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  4. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions," CARESS Working Papres 97-6, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Leigh TESFATSION, 1996. "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game With Preferential Partner Selection," Economic Report 38, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Esther Hauk, . "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Teaching Agent-Based Computational Economics to Graduate Students," Computational Economics 9809001, EconWPA, revised 16 Nov 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Edward L. Glaeser & Jose A. Scheinkman, 2001. "Non-Market Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1914, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Illan Eshel & Emilia Sansone & Avner Shaked, 1996. "Evolutionar Dnamics of Populations wirth a Local Interaction Structure," Discussion Paper Serie B 350, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  11. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Giorgio Fagiolo & Luigi Marengo & Marco Valente, 2003. "Endogenous Networks in Random Population Games," LEM Papers Series 2003/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Giorgio Fagiolo, 2001. "Coordination, Local Interactions and Endogenous Neighborhood Formation," LEM Papers Series 2001/15, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Stephen Morrs, . ""Contagion''," CARESS Working Papres 97-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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