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Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection

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Esther Hauk () (European University Institute, Florence)

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Abstract

In many situations that can be characterized as a prisoner's dilemma (PD) agents are not prisoners forced to play the game with whoever they face but are free to select their game partners. Opening the prison door adds an interesting dimension to the original game: players face two strategic choices: how to play - their PD strategy - and whom to play with. Those choices are interlinked for whom to play with depends on your PD strategy while the success of this strategy depends on the distribution of strategies in the population - on the potential game partners. This paper examines with the help of simulations how the choice possibility affects the performance of fixed strategies represented as finite automata and the social network emerging from preferential partner selection. As such it serves as a basis for the more compete analysis in which players can also revise their PD strategies. It is shown that when strategy revision is gradual and limited to a certain given set of strategies strategy revision combined with preferential partner selection leads to stable cooperative play. In the repeated context an intermediate case between free and forced interactions is also examined in which players cannot play everyone who is willing to play them nor refuse every unacceptable offer.

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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 with number _067.

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Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf6:_067

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1995. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 64, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
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  2. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Tullock, Gordon, 1985. "Adam Smith and the Prisoners' Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(5), pages 1073-81, Supp.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, D. & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2004. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," Game Theory and Information 9805004, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1998. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Leigh TESFATSION, 1996. "An Evolutionary Trade Network Game With Preferential Partner Selection," Economic Report 38, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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