Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game
Abstract
This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context. Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modeled as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. Particular attention is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that these trade networks support. Related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htmDownload Info
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Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 1230.Length:
Date of creation: 01 Apr 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:1230
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: Gale-Shapley matching; partner choice; agent-based modeling; evolutionary market game; Trade Network Game (TNG);Other versions of this item:
- Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game," Game Theory and Information 9805004, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1998.
- B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, EconWPA.
- Rodrigo Harrison, 2003.
"Global Games with Strategic Substitutes,"
Working Papers
gueconwpa~03-03-06, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Rodrigo Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Global Games with Strategic Substitutes," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-07, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Bloch, Francis & Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2008.
"Informal insurance in social networks,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 36-58, November.
- Francis Bloch (GREQAM and Universite de la Mediterranee), Garance Genicot (Georgetown University, and Debraj Ray (New York University and Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC)), 2004. "Informal Insurance in Social Networks," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
- Francis Bloch & Garance Genicot, 2005. "Informal Insurance in Social Networks," 2005 Meeting Papers 156, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Bhaskar Dutta & Sayantan Ghosal & Debraj Ray, 2004.
"Farsighted Network Formation,"
Working papers
122, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003.
"A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency,"
Game Theory and Information
0303011, EconWPA.
- Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Ex Ante Capacity Effects in Evolutionary Labor Markets with Adaptive Search," Labor and Demography 9811003, EconWPA.
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