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Gale-Shapley Matching in an Evolutionary Trade Network Game

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  • Tesfatsion, Leigh S.

Abstract

This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context. Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modeled as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time. Particular attention is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that these trade networks support. Related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm

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File URL: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/publications/papers/p3758-1998-04-01.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 1230.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1998
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Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:1230

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Related research

Keywords: Gale-Shapley matching; partner choice; agent-based modeling; evolutionary market game; Trade Network Game (TNG);

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References

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  1. Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
  2. Vriend, Nicolaas J, 1995. "Self-Organization of Markets: An Example of a Computational Approach," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 8(3), pages 205-31, August.
  3. Yannis M. Ioannides, 1996. "Evolution of Trading Structures," Working Papers 96-04-020, Santa Fe Institute.
  4. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
  5. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  6. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Economic Report 37, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
  7. David Banks & Kathleen Carley, 1994. "Metric inference for social networks," Journal of Classification, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 121-149, March.
  8. McFadzean, David & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 1999. "A C++ Platform for the Evolution of Trade Networks," Staff General Research Papers 1639, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  9. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  10. William A. Brock & Steven N. Durlauf, 1995. "Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory," NBER Working Papers 5291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. repec:att:wimass:9426 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  13. Gerard Weisbuch & Alan Kirman & Dorothea Herreiner, 1995. "Market Organization," Working Papers 95-11-102, Santa Fe Institute.
  14. Joshua M. Epstein & Robert L. Axtell, 1996. "Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262550253, December.
  15. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
  16. Sergei Guriev & Igor Pospelov & Margarita Shakhova, . "Self-Organization of Trade Networks in an Economy with Imperfect Infrastructure," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _022, Society for Computational Economics.
  17. Stanley, E.A. & Ashlock, Daniel & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1994. "Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners," Staff General Research Papers 11180, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  18. Esther Hauk, . "Leaving the Prison: A Discussion of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under Preferential Partner Selection," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _067, Society for Computational Economics.
  19. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rodrigo Harrison, 2003. "Global Games with Strategic Substitutes," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-06, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Francis Bloch (GREQAM and Universite de la Mediterranee), Garance Genicot (Georgetown University, and Debraj Ray (New York University and Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC)), 2004. "Informal Insurance in Social Networks," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-16, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, EconWPA.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
  6. Leigh Tesfatsion, 1998. "Ex Ante Capacity Effects in Evolutionary Labor Markets with Adaptive Search," Labor and Demography 9811003, EconWPA.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA.

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