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Structure, behavior, and market power in an evolutionary labor market with adaptive search

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  • Tesfatsion, Leigh

Abstract

This study undertakes a systematic experimental investigation of the relationship between market power and labor market structure (concentration and capacity conditions) when workers and employers preferentially match based on past worksite experiences. For each tested market structure, workers and employers repeatedly seek preferred worksite partners based on continually updated expected utility, engage in efficiency-wage worksite interactions modeled as prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their worksite behaviors over time. A key finding is the presence of strong learning and network effects. Each tested market structure maps into a "spectral" distribution of observed interaction networks exhibiting one dominant attractor (frequent network pattern) with one or two weaker attractors (less frequent network patterns). Market structure is strongly predictive for the relative market power of workers and employers across all network attractors, but the magnitudes of the market power levels attained by workers and employers vary widely across the network attractors. Annotated pointers to related work can be accessed here: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tnghome.htm

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 25 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 419-457

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:25:y:2001:i:3-4:p:419-457

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  1. Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1989. "Empirical studies of industries with market power," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 1011-1057 Elsevier.
  2. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1997. "How Economists Can Get Alife," Staff General Research Papers 1685, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Joel L. Schrag, 1999. "First Impressions Matter: A Model Of Confirmatory Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 37-82, February.
  4. McFadzean, David & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1999. "A C++ Platform for the Evolution of Trade Networks," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 14(1-2), pages 109-34, October.
  5. Leigh TESFATSION, 1995. "A Trade Network Game With Endogenous Partner Selection," Economic Report 36, Iowa State University Department of Economics.
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 63-78, January.
  7. Dan Ashlock & Mark D. Smucker & E. Ann Stanley & Leigh Tesfatsion, 1995. "Preferential Partner Selection in an Evolutionary Study of Prisoner's Dilemma," Game Theory and Information 9501002, EconWPA, revised 20 Jan 1995.
  8. Tesfatsion, Leigh, 1998. "Preferential Partner Selection in Evolutionary Labor Markets: A Study in Agent-Based Computational Economics," Staff General Research Papers 2048, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Nicolaisen, James & Petrov, Valentin & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2000. "Market Power and Efficiency in a Computational Electricity Market with Discriminatory Double-Auction Pricing," Staff General Research Papers 1952, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Boudreau, James W., 2010. "Stratification and growth in agent-based matching markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 168-179, August.
  3. Marco Raberto & Andrea Teglio & Silvano Cincotti, 2008. "Integrating Real and Financial Markets in an Agent-Based Economic Model: An Application to Monetary Policy Design," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 147-162, September.
  4. Sandra Tavares Silva & Aurora A.C. Teixeira, 2006. "An evolutionary model of firms' institutional behavior focusing on labor decisions," FEP Working Papers 227, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  5. Giovanni Dosi & Giorgio Fagiolo & Roberto Gabriele, 2004. "Towards an Evolutionary Interpretation of Aggregate Labor Market Regularities," LEM Papers Series 2004/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  6. Neugart, Michael, 2008. "Labor market policy evaluation with ACE," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 418-430, August.
  7. Giovanni Dosi & Giorgio Fagiolo & Andrea Roventini, 2008. "Schumpeter Meeting Keynes: A Policy-Friendly Model of Endogenous Growth and Business Cycles," Working Papers 50/2008, University of Verona, Department of Economics.
  8. Yang, J.-H. Steffi, 2009. "Social network influence and market instability," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3-4), pages 257-276, March.
  9. Dan Farhat, 2011. "Bookworms versus Party Animals: An Artificial Labor Market with Human and Social Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 1103, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised May 2011.
  10. Matteo Richiardi, 2003. "On the Use of Agent-Based Simulations," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 32, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
  11. Cincotti, Silvano & Raberto, Marco & Teglio, Andrea, 2010. "Credit money and macroeconomic instability in the agent-based model and simulator Eurace," Economics Discussion Papers 2010-4, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  12. Nie, Pu-yan, 2009. "Commitment for storable goods under vertical integration," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 414-417, March.
  13. Christian Martin & Michael Neugart, 2009. "Shocks and Endogenous Institutions: An Agent-based Model of Labor Market Performance in Turbulent Times," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 33(1), pages 31-46, February.
  14. Klos, Tomas B. & Nooteboom, Bart, 2001. "Agent-based computational transaction cost economics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 503-526, March.

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