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Contagion

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  • Stephen Morris

Abstract

Each player in an infinite population interacts strategically with a finite subset of that population. Suppose each player's binary choice in each period is a best response to the population choices of the previous period. When can behaviour that is initially played by only a finite set of player spread to the whole population? This paper characterizes when such contagion is possible for arbitrary local interaction systems. Maximal contagion occurs when local interaction is sufficiently uniform and there is low neighbour growth, i.e. the number of players who can be reached in k steps does not grow exponentially in k. Copyright 2000 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited

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Paper provided by Penn Economics Department in its series Penn CARESS Working Papers with number ab67d13cfae3b5b56b7b9df3bc7e7758.

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Handle: RePEc:cla:penntw:ab67d13cfae3b5b56b7b9df3bc7e7758

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References

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  1. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  2. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA.
  3. Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997. "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 551-556.
  4. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
  5. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  6. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "The coexistence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 241-256, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Sebastian Edwards, 2002. "Does the Current Account Matter?," NBER Chapters, in: Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, pages 21-76 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Yannis Ioannides, 2001. "Topologies of Social Interactions," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0104, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  3. Ianni, Antonella & Corradi, Valentina, 2000. "Consensus, contagion and clustering in a space-time model of public opinion formation," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0009, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Stephen Morris & Hyun S Shin, 2001. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001080, David K. Levine.
  5. Dean Corbae & John Duffy, 2003. "Experiments with Network Formation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000319, David K. Levine.
  6. Martin Shubik & Thomas Quint, 2004. "On Local and Network Games," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm361, Yale School of Management.
  7. Mary Burke & Gary Fournier, 2005. "The Emergence of Local Norms in Networks," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 299, Society for Computational Economics.
  8. Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Working papers 16, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  9. John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, EconWPA.
  10. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 2004. "Financial Intermediaries and Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1061, 07.
  11. Michael Chwe, 2006. "Statistical Game Theory," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000004, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Allen wilhite, 2005. "PD Games on Networks," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 20, Society for Computational Economics.

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