This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.
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Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences in its series CARESS Working Papres with number
97-6.
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Stephen Morrs, .
""Contagion'',"
CARESS Working Papres
97-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
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