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Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?

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  • Bomze Immanuel M.
  • Weibull Jorgen W.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 11 (1995)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 173-192

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:173-192

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Cited by:
  1. Thomas Norman, 2005. "Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces," Economics Series Working Papers 251, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1996. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games," Working Paper Series 450, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. Torstensson, Pär, 2005. "Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion," Working Papers 2005:37, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  4. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
  5. Rota Bulò, Samuel & Bomze, Immanuel M., 2011. "Infection and immunization: A new class of evolutionary game dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 193-211, January.
  6. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July.
  7. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment," MPRA Paper 49375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
  9. Pawlowitsch, Christina, 2008. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 203-226, May.
  10. Keyzer, Michiel & van Wesenbeeck, Lia, 2005. "Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 285-301, April.
  11. Binmore, Ken & Piccione, Michele & Samuelson, Larry, 1998. "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 257-291, June.
  12. MILCHTAICH, Igal, 1999. "How does selfishness affect well-being ?," CORE Discussion Papers 1999054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Poulsen, A., 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Papers 01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
  14. K. Farmer & I. Kubin & B. Moldovanu, 1992. "Book reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 113-117, February.
  15. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2012. "Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 311-320.
  16. Heller, Yuval, 2014. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 132-136.
  17. Heller, Yuval, 2013. "Stability and trembles in extensive-form games," MPRA Paper 48160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Thomas Norman, 2004. "Dynamically Stable Preferences," Economics Series Working Papers 207, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  19. Christina Pawlowitsch, 2006. "Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal proto-language.An approach based on the replicator dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 0604, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

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