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On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Joerg Oechssler (University of Bonn)
Frank Riedel (Humboldt University)
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We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number
0004004.
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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 06 Jul 2000Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004004Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 26Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: replicator dynamics evolutionary stability ESS CSS Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Josef Hofbauer & Jörg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2005.
"Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case ,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse38_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Josef Hofbauer & Joerg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 2005.
"Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case ,"
Game Theory and Information
0512003, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Josef Hofbauer & Jörg Oechssler, 2005.
"Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case ,"
Working Papers
0424, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2005.
[Downloadable!] Hofbauer, Josef & Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 2005.
"Brown-von Neumann-Nash Dynamics: The Continuous Strategy Case ,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
05-41, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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Economics Series Working Papers
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Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Korth, Christian & Napel, Stefan, 2003.
"Reciprocity - an indirect evolutionary analysis ,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
03-32, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
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Other versions: Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005.
"Robust Monopoly Pricing: The Case of Regret ,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2005/10, European University Institute.
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Torstensson, Pär, 2005.
"Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion ,"
Working Papers
2005:37, Lund University, Department of Economics.
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Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004.
"Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups ,"
Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
1017, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
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Other versions: Ross Cressman & Josef Hofbauer & Frank Riedel, 2005.
"Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space ,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse12_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2007.
"Robust Monopoly Pricing ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000983, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2003.
"Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect ,"
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers
bgse5_2003, University of Bonn, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Joerg Oechssler, 1997.
"Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect ,"
Game Theory and Information
9702001, EconWPA, revised 15 May 1997.
[Downloadable!] S. Huck & G. Kirchsteiger & J. Oechssler, .
"Learning to Like What You Have -Explaining the Endowment Effect- ,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 373
1997-38, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
Steffen Huck & Georg Kirchsteiger & Jörg Oechssler, 2005.
"Learning to like what you have - explaining the endowment effect ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 689-702, 07.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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